ED Entreprise Economie Société
The independence of the central bank, the case of the central bank of Mauritania
by Jemal BREIDELEIL (BSE - Bordeaux sciences économiques)
The defense will take place at 13h00 - Salle Manon Cormier Université de Bordeaux 16 avenue Léon Duguit 33608 Pessac CEDEX
in front of the jury composed of
- Matthieu MONTALBAN - Maître de conférences - Université de Bordeaux - Directeur de these
- Yamina TADJEDDINE - Professeure des universités - Université de Lorraine - Rapporteur
- JEAN-FRANÇOIS PONSOT - Professeur des universités - Laboratoire Pacte Université de Grenoble - Rapporteur
- CATHERINE FIGUIERE - Professeure des universités - Université de Grenoble - Examinateur
- Odile LAKOMSKI-LAGUERRE - Maîtresse de conférences - Université de Picardie Jules Verne (Amiens) - Examinateur
- Jérôme MAUCOURANT - Maître de conférences - Université Jean Monnet de Saint-Etienne - Examinateur
- Bertrand BLANCHETON - Professeur des universités - BSE Université de Bordeaux - Examinateur
- Alain PIVETEAU - Maître de conférences - Institut de recherche pour le développement (IRD) - CoDirecteur de these
Since their emergence, central banks have evolved into key players in economic development. Their independence is often portrayed as essential to shielding monetary policies from short-term political influences. However, this view is primarily rooted in a market-based understanding of money, neglecting its deeply institutional, social, and political nature. This thesis explores the dynamics of money, central banks, and social orders, focusing particularly on Mauritania. The main objective is to understand how monetary systems, economic policies, and institutions evolve over time and in different social contexts. The central theme of this research is the idea that the modern state and central banks play a crucial role in the transition between social systems based on personal relations—where goods and services circulate through personal networks—and those based on impersonal relations, characterized by a market economy. This is a political economy thesis on money, covering a wide range of topics, including central bank independence, political and economic struggles around monetary sovereignty, and the impact of institutions on social transformation. By adopting a multidisciplinary approach, the thesis aims to demonstrate how central banks act as institutional lock-in mechanisms essential for the functioning of a market economy. The theoretical framework is based on the idea that money and central banks are at the heart of modern social and economic construction. While central bank independence is often seen as a recent principle, its roots can be traced back to periods before the dismantling of the Bretton Woods system. However, the question of central bank independence cannot be understood solely through government-central bank relations. It must be viewed in a broader context that includes internal forces (private actors) and external forces (international financial institutions, financial markets) and their attempts to appropriate the monetary institution. The thesis also examines the specific case of Mauritania, a tribal society where personal relationships still play a significant role in the economy. The grafting of impersonal order institutions, such as central banks, onto a social structure dominated by personal relationships creates a semi-impersonal order. This process highlights the challenges of integrating impersonal order institutions into a personal order framework.